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Dynamic Real-time Verification of Program Call Flows
ABSTRACT
This disclosure describes a dynamic overlay that delineates control flows of an
application to identify unexpected code execution pathways that may be indicative of a security
breach. Identifying such unexpected (or unauthorized) execution pathways can enable their
prevention. The overlay is generated by observing the control flow through the application to
produce a histogram of probabilities from a first function call to subsequent function calls. Using
the overlay enables the detection of attacks with higher fidelity and at a lower cost than existing
approaches.
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BACKGROUND
Execution of unexpected pathways within a given piece of computer code is a tell-tale
sign of a security breach. For example, return-oriented programming (ROP and its variant, blind
ROP) is an exploit where an attacker gains control of the call stack to alter the control flow of a
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program and execute instruction sequences already present in the memory, allowing the attacker
to perform arbitrary operations on the compromised machine.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes a dynamic overlay that delineates control flows of an
application to identify unexpected code execution pathways. Identifying such unexpected (or
unauthorized) execution pathways can ultimately result in their prevention.
The overlay is generated by observing the control flow through the application to produce
a histogram of probabilities from a function call A1 to any subsequent call Az. Using the overlay
enables detection of attacks with higher fidelity and at a lower cost than existing approaches.

Fig. 1: Preparing a target application for control flow integrity
As illustrated in Fig. 1, a target application (100) is prepared for real-time verification of
API call flows, e.g., for control flow integrity, as follows. A control flow graph (102) is extracted
from the target application. Such extraction is required once per version of the application, e.g.,
not at every run of the application. The target application is instrumented (104) such that its
function calls during runtime can be sent to an observer process running in parallel to the target
application.
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Fig. 2: Dynamic, real-time verification of API call flows
Fig. 2 illustrates dynamic, real-time verification of API call flows of a target application
(202), instrumented as described above and observed by a tracker process (204). As the target
application runs, it generates a number of function calls, some valid and some suspect, e.g.,
indicative of an attack or security breach. The instrumentation on the target application enables
the observer/tracker process to track or observe the function calls (210a-b) which may occur in
any order.
A valid function call (206), e.g., a call specified in the code by the developer, is observed
without reaction, but a suspect function call (208) causes the observer/tracker process to generate
an alert or a controlled app exit (212). Some examples of suspect (or otherwise interesting)
function calls include:
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● Function calls whose input and output destinations have a low likelihood. The generation
of function call likelihoods is described below.
● Function calls that access sensitive application programming interfaces (APIs), user data,
or other artifacts.
● Function calls not specified in the code by the developer. If, for example, in the code,
function-A is called exclusively by function-B, a runtime call to function-A that does not
originate from function-B (or its encapsulating class or module) is suspect or at least of
interest.
● Function calls that occur from unexpected locations in memory (call frames), based on
the first call to the function upon program instantiation.
● Return values of any stack frame that differ from prior function calls originating from the
same call site.
● Any other static (or discrete) rule as specified by the code developer or tester.
Observing and tracking of suspect or interesting function calls occurs in a process (the
observer/tracker) distinct from and parallel to the target application, e.g., read and write duties
are separated between the observer and the target. Such separation ensures that an attack is
actually prevented; integration of the observer functionality into the target application might
slow down the application but not prevent an attack. The observer/tracker uses the extracted
control flow graph (as illustrated in Fig. 1) to determine if runtime function calls executed by the
target application conform to the graph. Violations of the graph generate alerts or controlled
application exits.
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Fig. 3: Development of call likelihood probabilities and testing for blocking conditions
Fig. 3 illustrates the development of call likelihood probabilities and testing for blocking
conditions. A histogram of calls between functions is maintained. The event of a call from a
function A to a function B results in an update within the histogram of the relative frequency
(likelihood) of the A→B call. Similarly, a call from A to Z results in the addition or update of the
relative frequency of the A→Z call. Before the histogram is updated, the function call is tested
for blocking conditions, e.g., a function call with a signature of an exploit, as described above. If
a blocking condition is met, then the call is blocked, an alert is issued, or a controlled exit is
executed.
In this manner, the described techniques can rapidly detect control flow violations that
originate from memory corruption, buffer overflow, or other types of exploits by:
1. extracting a control flow graph for a given program
2. labeling its edges with transition probabilities
3. identifying calls that deviate from the labeled control flow graph, and
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4. upon detection of deviated calls, blocking the calls or by issuing an alert.
In an implementation with controlled exits, e.g., shadow stacks, the techniques detect and
guard against ROP or BROP activity. The techniques provide an effective mechanism for deep
inspection of the call stack and for maintaining the integrity of the control flow.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes a dynamic overlay that delineates control flows of an
application to identify unexpected code execution pathways that may be indicative of a security
breach. Identifying such unexpected (or unauthorized) execution pathways can enable their
prevention. The overlay is generated by observing the control flow through the application to
produce a histogram of probabilities from a first function call to subsequent function calls. Using
the overlay enables the detection of attacks with higher fidelity and at a lower cost than existing
approaches.
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